

## CHAPTER 20

# Foreign Policy and Military Policy

### OBJECTIVES

This chapter presents a survey of selected topics in United States foreign policy; and explores the structures and policies for making military policy. After reading and reviewing the material in this chapter, the student should be able to do each of the following:

1. List the constitutional powers of the president and compare them with the authority of Congress in foreign affairs. Explain why the president now has a larger role than the Framers necessarily intended.
2. Explain why checks on the powers of the national government in foreign affairs are primarily political rather than constitutional.
3. Give reasons for the volatility of public opinion on foreign affairs. Describe the problems that the president may face, using public opinion on the Vietnam War as an example.
4. Explain the worldview concept and describe the containment strategy of George Kennan. Summarize essential elements of the anti-appeasement, disengagement, and human-rights worldviews.
5. Analyze the key allocative decisions about the defense budget. Explain how the congressional role in deciding on weapons systems has changed in recent years.
6. Explain why the 1947 and 1949 Defense Reorganization Acts did not merge the armed services. Review the present structure of the department, and explain how it contributes to inter-service rivalries. Discuss the reforms adopted in 1986 and the challenges the services confront in fighting the war on terrorism.
7. Explain why the cost-overrun problem is due to bureaucratic and political factors, and describe proposed reforms of the system.

### OVERVIEW

The great issues of national diplomacy and military policy are shaped by majoritarian politics. The president is the dominant figure, political ideology is important, and interest groups are central only to those issues—such as free trade or the allocation of military contracts—that engage their interests.

But majority opinion is weakly defined. In general, it approves of the United States playing an international role, but in particular cases would like the U.S. to stay at home and mind its own business. When there is a crisis or when troops are sent overseas, however, the decisions and the troops are strongly supported.

Elite opinion plays a more powerful role, but is divided into four worldviews: isolationist, containment, disengagement, and human rights. The first is less common today than once was the case, but the remaining three are deeply at odds over whether we should have stayed in Vietnam, driven Iraqi troops out of Kuwait, given aid to Bosnia, or launched an air campaign in Kosovo.

Foreign and military decision making is organized to give civilians control. The president is assisted chiefly by the National Security Council, which includes the secretaries of state and defense. Civilian

control of the military is vested in the president who issues orders through the secretary of defense. The Joint Chiefs of Staff is a planning and advisory body.

When the military budget is developed, it tends to obey majoritarian politics, but when it is spent on the services and military contractors, interest-group politics intervenes.

## CHAPTER OUTLINE WITH KEYED-IN RESOURCES

- I. Kinds of foreign policy (THEME A: FOREIGN POLICY AS MAJORITARIAN POLITICS)
  - A. Majoritarian politics
    1. Foreign policy is perceived to confer widespread benefits, impose widespread costs
    2. Examples
      - a) War
      - b) Military alliances
      - c) Nuclear test ban or strategic arms limitation treaties
      - d) Response to Berlin blockade by Soviets
      - e) Cuban missile crisis
      - f) Decision to aid Nicaraguan contras
      - g) Diplomatic recognition of People's Republic of China
  - B. Interest-group politics
    1. Identifiable groups pitted against one another for costs, benefits
    2. Example: tariffs on Japanese steel
  - C. Client politics
    1. Benefits to identifiable group, without apparent costs to any distinct group
    2. Examples:
      - a) Policy toward Israel (transformation to interest-group politics?)
      - b) Aid to U.S. corporations doing business abroad
  - D. Who has power?
    1. Majoritarian politics: president dominates, public opinion supports but does not guide the president
    2. Interest-group or client politics: larger congressional role
    3. Entrepreneurial politics: Congress the central political arena
- II. The constitutional and legal context
  - A. Constitution creates an "invitation to struggle" for the president and Congress on war powers
    1. President is the commander in chief but Congress appropriates the money
    2. President appoints ambassadors but Senate confirms them
    3. President negotiates treaties but the Senate must ratify them with a two-thirds vote
    4. Only Congress can regulate commerce with other nations and declare war
    5. But Americans think that the president is in charge and history confirms that belief
  - B. Presidential box score
    1. Presidents have been relatively strong in foreign affairs
      - a) More success in Congress on foreign affairs than on domestic affairs
      - b) President may be stronger than the Framers intended regarding military deployment and diplomacy
        - (1) 1801, Jefferson sends the Navy to deal with the Barbary pirates
        - (2) 1845, Polk sends troops to Mexico
        - (3) 1861, Lincoln blockades southern ports and declares martial law
        - (4) 1940, FDR sends destroyers to Britain to be used against Germany (US was technically at peace with Germany)
        - (5) 1950, Truman sends troops to Korea
        - (6) 1960s, Kennedy, Johnson send advisors and then troops to Vietnam

- (7) 1983, Reagan sends troops to Grenada to overthrow a pro-Castro regime
  - (8) 1987, Reagan sends the Navy to protect tankers in Persian Gulf
  - (9) 1989, George H.W. Bush orders the invasion of Panama
  - (10) 1990, George H.W. Bush sends forces into Saudi Arabia when Iraq invades Kuwait
  - (11) 1999, Clinton orders attacks against Serbs in Kosovo
  - (12) 2001, George W. Bush sends troops to Afghanistan
  - (13) 2003, George W. Bush invades Iraq
2. And yet presidents have been comparatively weak in foreign affairs by standards of other nations
    - a) Other heads of state find U.S. presidents unable to act
      - (1) Wilson and FDR were unable to ally with Britain before World War I and World War II
      - (2) Wilson was unable to lead United States into League of Nations
      - (3) Ford could not intervene in Angola to support an anti-Marxist regime
      - (4) Reagan was criticized on his commitments to El Salvador and Lebanon
      - (5) Congressional debate on G.H.W. Bush's waging of Gulf War was extended
      - (6) G.W. Bush's decision to invade Iraq was bitterly controversial in the 2004 election
    - b) Treaties signed by the president are little more than a promise to try to get the Senate to act
- C. Evaluating the power of the president
1. Depends on one's agreement/disagreement with the policies
  2. Supreme Court has ruled that the federal government has foreign and military policy powers beyond those specifically mentioned in the Constitution
  3. Supreme Court is reluctant to intervene in Congress-president disputes about war powers
    - a) Lincoln's extraordinary measures during Civil War
    - b) Carter's freezing of Iranian assets during the hostage crisis
    - c) FDR's "relocation" of 100,000 Japanese Americans
    - d) Johnson, Nixon, and Vietnam War
  4. One of few Supreme Court limitations on president's wartime powers: reversal of Truman's steel mill seizure (1952)
- D. Checks on presidential power are chiefly political rather than constitutional
1. Congress: control of purse strings
  2. Congress also limits the president's ability to give military or economic aid to other countries; examples:
    - a) Arms sales to Turkey (1974–1978)
    - b) Blocked intervention in Angola (1976)
    - c) Legislative veto (previously) on large arms sales
  3. The War Powers Act of 1973
    - a) Provisions
      - (1) All commitments of troops in hostile situations must be reported within forty-eight hours
      - (2) Only a sixty-day commitment of troops can be made unless there is a declaration of war or a specific statutory authorization
    - b) Observance
      - (1) Every president since the passage of the War Powers Act has sent troops abroad without congressional approval
      - (2) Presidents deny that the War Powers Act is constitutional

- (3) Supreme Court declared the legislative veto unconstitutional and this is a crucial element of the act
      - (4) Congress is reluctant to cut off appropriations for these missions
    - 4. Intelligence oversight
      - a) House and Senate intelligence committees must be fully informed; including covert operations
      - b) Committees have no authority to disapprove covert action
      - c) Congress sometimes blocks covert action: Boland Amendment (1982–1985) prevented military aid to the contras in Nicaragua for specific periods
- III. The machinery of foreign policy
  - A. Consequences of major power status for United States following World War II
    - 1. President more involved in foreign affairs
    - 2. More agencies shape foreign policy—no longer just the State Department
  - B. Foreign policy agencies cannot be coordinated by the Department of State
    - 1. Job is too big
    - 2. Many agencies have foreign missions abroad (Defense, CIA, Agriculture, Commerce, Labor, FBI, DEA, AID)
    - 3. Most of these agencies owe no political or bureaucratic loyalty to the secretary of state
  - C. National Security Council (NSC) was created to coordinate departments and agencies
    - 1. Chaired by president and includes vice president, secretaries of state and defense; usually includes the director of the CIA, chair of Joint Chiefs of Staff, attorney general
    - 2. National security adviser (NSA) heads staff
    - 3. Goal of staff is to present various perspectives, facilitate presidential decision making, and implement presidential decisions
    - 4. Grown in influence since JFK
    - 5. Downgraded by Reagan but NSC appointees precipitated Iran-contra scandal
    - 6. NSA may rival the secretary of state
  - D. Consequences of multicentered decision-making machinery for policy-decisions
    - 1. “It’s never over” due to rivalries within and between executive, legislative branches
    - 2. Agency positions are influenced by agency interests
- IV. Foreign policy and public opinion
  - A. Outlines of foreign policy are shaped by public and elite opinion
    - 1. Before World War II, public opposed U.S. involvement in world affairs
    - 2. World War II shifted popular opinion
      - a) Universally popular war—few recriminations afterward
      - b) War seemed successful
      - c) U.S. emerged as the world’s dominant power
    - 3. Support for active involvement persisted until Vietnam
      - a) Support for internationalism has been highly general
      - b) Public opinion is now mushy and volatile
  - B. Backing the president
    - 1. Public tends to support the president in crises
      - a) Strong support, rally ‘round the flag, in presidential foreign policy initiatives
      - b) Boost in popularity often occurs immediately after crisis
        - (1) Exceptions: Boost did not occur when Clinton sent troops to Bosnia or launched attacks on Iraq
        - (2) Attack on America (9/11) boosted G.W. Bush’s favorability rating from 51% to 86%
      - c) Military casualties often lead the public to support escalation, so fighting will end more quickly

2. Tradition of opposition
  - a) About 20% of Americans opposed invading Iraq, Vietnam, and Korea
  - b) Opposition is generally highest among Democrats, African Americans, and people with a postgraduate degree
- C. Mass versus elite opinion
  1. Mass opinion
    - a) Generally poorly informed about foreign policy
    - b) But since World War II, public has generally felt the U.S. should play an important international role
  2. Elite opinion
    - a) Well informed but opinions are likely to change
    - b) Leaders are more liberal and internationalist than the public
    - c) Cleavage between mass and elite opinion even wider if elite is restricted only to those involved in making foreign policy
- V. Cleavages among foreign policy elites (THEME B: THE FOREIGN POLICY ELITE)
  - A. Elite opinion is especially important because mass opinion is permissive and mushy—but elites are very divided
  - B. The foreign policy elite
    1. Senior officials of the State Department
    2. Staff of the National Security Council
    3. Members and staff of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and the House International Relations Committee
    4. Members of the Council on Foreign Relations (private organization)
    5. Editors of Foreign Affairs and Foreign Policy
  - C. How a worldview shapes foreign policy
    1. Definition of worldview (or paradigm): comprehensive mental picture of world issues facing United States and appropriate or inappropriate ways of responding
    2. Example: article by “Mr. X” (George Kennan) on containment of U.S.S.R.
    3. Not unanimously accepted, but consistent with public’s mood, events, and experience
  - D. Four worldviews
    1. Isolationism paradigm (1920s–1930s)
      - a) Opposes getting involved in wars
      - b) Adopted after World War I since that war accomplished little
    2. Containment (anti-appeasement) paradigm (1940s–1960s)
      - a) Pearl Harbor ended isolationism in U.S.
      - b) Reaction to appeasement of Hitler in Munich
      - c) Postwar policy to resist Soviet expansionism
    3. Disengagement (Vietnam) paradigm (1970s, continuing)
      - a) Reaction to military defeat and political disaster of Vietnam
      - b) Vietnam interpreted in three ways:
        - (1) Containment was the correct worldview but the U.S. did not try hard enough to win the war
        - (2) Correct worldview but it was applied in wrong place, under wrong circumstances
        - (3) Worldview itself was wrong
      - c) Critics believed the containment worldview was wrong and adopted a new isolationism

4. Human rights
    - a) Prevent genocide: the mass murder of people, usually because of their race or ethnicity
    - b) Applied unevenly (Europe but not Africa) and without historical awareness
  5. New question arose after the September 11th attacks: Should the U.S. act unilaterally or with a broad coalition?
- VI. The use of military force
- A. Two views of the military
    1. Majoritarian politics
      - a) Everyone is protected, every taxpayer pays
      - b) President is commander in chief and Congress has a supportive role
    2. Client politics
      - a) Beneficiaries are generals, defense contractors, and members of Congress
      - b) Military budget reflects lobbying skills of the military-industrial complex
- VII. The defense budget
- A. Total spending
    1. Small peacetime military until 1950
      - a) No disarmament after Korea due to containment policy
      - b) Military system designed to repel Soviet invasion of Europe and small-scale invasions
    2. Changes in spending reflect public opinion and general support for a large military
    3. Demise of the U.S.S.R. generated a debate
      - a) Liberals: sharp defense cuts; U.S. should collect the peace dividend
      - b) Conservatives: some cuts but retain well-funded military since the world was still a dangerous place
    4. Desert Storm (1991) and Kosovo (1999) demonstrated that the U.S. would have to use military force
    5. With Kosovo, it also became clear that cuts had impaired the military's ability to conduct a sustained campaign
  - B. What do we get with our money?
    1. Personnel
      - a) All-volunteer force instituted after Vietnam
      - b) Steady increase in percentage of women in the military
      - c) Presence of gay servicepeople still a source of controversy
    2. Big ticket items
      - a) Cost overruns: the difference between actual costs and estimated costs
      - b) Reasons for cost overruns
        - (1) Hard to know in advance what something that has never existed before will actually cost to build
        - (2) People have an incentive to underestimate the costs to get the weapon approved
        - (3) Pentagon officials want "the best" money can buy (goldplating)
        - (4) Sole-sourcing: no competition means no incentive to control costs
        - (5) Congress cuts military budget not by canceling weapons, but by spreading out construction schedule

3. Small ticket items
  - a) The \$435 hammer: largely a myth that grew out of complicated Pentagon accounting procedure
  - b) Problem is getting small equipment (e.g., a coffeemaker) that will fit into an odd space (e.g., a plane)
  - c) Same problems occur as with big ticket items
4. Readiness
  - a) Client politics makes readiness a low priority (after building equipment and maintaining bases)
  - b) Training and readiness have no specific client constituencies
5. Bases
  - a) System for locating/maintaining military bases was purely client politics
  - b) 1988: Commission on Base Realignment and Closure created to consider recommendations from Secretary of Defense
  - c) Congress had to vote on recommendations *as a whole*, no amendments possible
  - d) 1989 – 86 bases closed; 1991 – 34 more bases closed

VIII. The structure of defense decision making (THEME C: HOW ARE MILITARY SPENDING DECISIONS MADE?)

- A. National Security Act of 1947
  1. Department of Defense
    - a) Secretary of Defense is a civilian, as are secretaries of army, navy, air force
    - b) Joint Chiefs of Staff are military officers
    - c) Two reasons for separate uniformed services
      - (1) Fear that unified military will become too powerful
      - (2) Desire of services to preserve their autonomy
- B. 1986 defense-reorganization plan—Goldwater-Nichols Act
  1. Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS)
    - a) Composed of uniformed head of each service
    - b) JCS chair and vice chair are appointed by president and confirmed by Senate
    - c) JCS does not have command authority over troops, but plays a key role in defense planning
    - d) Since 1986, JCS chair has been designated the principal military adviser to president, so that the chair may also have greater influence within JCS
  2. Joint Staff
    - a) Composed of officers from each service assisting the JCS
    - b) Since 1986, the joint staff serves chair; its members are promoted at same rate as those within their service branch
  3. The services
    - a) Civilian secretary responsible for purchasing and public affairs
    - b) Senior military officer, who oversees discipline and training, represents service on JCS
  4. The chain of command
    - a) President to secretary of defense to unified and specified commands
    - b) Chair of JCS does not have combat command
    - c) Uncertain whether the 1986 changes will work—1991 Persian Gulf victory was taken as a positive indication

- IX. The new problem of terrorism
- A. Since 9/11 foreign policy has had to focus on terrorism and what to do with nations that have harbored terrorists
  - B. Superpower status in a unipolar world still leaves U.S. vulnerable both here and abroad to terrorist attacks
  - C. “New” view issued by George W. Bush in September 2002: Doctrine of Pre-Emption
    1. America will act against emerging threats before they are fully formed
    2. Will identify and destroy terrorist threat before it reaches our borders
    3. Will not hesitate to act alone
    4. Debate has divided Congress in a way that is unusual in foreign policy
      - a) Supporters: hailed it as a positive step to defeat terrorists
      - b) Critics: justifies pre-emptive and possibly unjust wars, and abandons the United Nations
    5. Politics no longer “ends at the water’s edge”: lack of common enemy that unites both parties
  - D. United Nations support
    1. Sought and obtained U.N. support in regard to Korea and forcing Iraq out of Kuwait
    2. Did not seek U.N. support in regard to Vietnam, Haiti, Bosnia, or Kosovo
    3. Sought but did not obtain U.N. support in invading Iraq in 2003
  - E. Rebuilding nations after war
    1. Previous experience
      - a) Helped Japan and Germany after World War II (successful)
      - b) Tried to help Somalia (1992-1994) (failed)
      - c) Tried to install democratically elected president in Haiti (1994-1996) (failed)
      - d) Worked to restore order in Bosnia and Kosovo (making progress)
      - e) Now working in Afghanistan and Iraq (making progress)
    2. Lessons
      - a) Do not leave quickly; rebuilding takes time
      - b) Organize your own agencies
      - c) Make certain civilian and military operations are carefully coordinated
    3. Very difficult, due to differing opinions between agencies and lack of continuity across administrations

## WEB RESOURCES

### Human Rights Resources

The Internet has greatly facilitated political research and political activism, and these effects are especially evident in regard to human rights. Several organizations are entirely web based, while others have greatly enhanced their effectiveness by using Internet information and communications technology. The following listing indicates only a few of the most well-known resources.

Amnesty International: <http://www.amnesty.org/>

Derechose Human Rights: <http://www.derechose.org/>

Human Rights Internet: <http://www.hri.ca/>

Human Rights Watch: <http://www.hrw.org/>

Project Diana, Orville H. Schell, Jr. Center for International Human Rights, Yale Law School:  
<http://www.diana.law.yale.edu/diana>

The United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights: <http://www.unhchr.ch/>



## Defense and Intelligence Resources

Intelligence Resource Program: <http://www.fas.org/irp/official.htm>

U.S. Department of Defense: <http://www.defenselink.mil/>

U.S. Department of Defense: Education Program: <http://www.odedodea.edu/>

U.S. Department of State: <http://www.state.gov/>

U.S. Department of State, Under Secretary for Arms Control and International Security:  
<http://www.state.govt/>

U.S. Intelligence Community: <http://www.cia.gov/ic/>

U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff: <http://www.dtic.mil/jcs/core/index.html>

U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence: <http://intelligence.senate.gov/>

## RESEARCH AND DISCUSSION TOPICS

**Should elites have discretion in foreign policy-making?** In Chapter 13, members of Congress were described as having considerable discretion in decision making related to foreign policy. Similarly, in this chapter, it is noted that the president and the executive branch have often assumed the initiative in the foreign policy arena. Table 20.2, however, indicates that the opinions of elites and of the public are often quite different in this policy arena. Should elites exercise less discretion in decision-making about foreign policy? Would the American public be able and willing to check their decision-makers?

**Should the United States take action on behalf of human rights or should its foreign policy consider only the military and economic needs of American citizens?** This became one of the most controversial issues of the Clinton administration and continues to be a concern throughout the George W. Bush administration. If the United States acts only on behalf of its own military and economic interests, can it expect other nations to cooperate in various actions and policies? If the United States ignores human rights in its conduct of international relations, is it violating its own precepts? For example, does the Declaration of Independence have any relevance to present-day foreign relations? Are there military and economic costs associated with a failure to protect human rights?

**How much military spending is enough?** Figure 20.2 sets out the public opinion data on military spending. What domestic and international events coincide with the public's judgment that too much is being spent on the military? that not enough is being spent? What are some of the popular misconceptions about military spending? For a breakdown of the military budget, tracing where the money goes, see the Department of Defense websites listed for this chapter and the budget websites listed for Chapter 18, Economic Policy.

## IMPORTANT TERMS

- \*containment** The belief that the United States should resist the expansion of aggressive nations, especially the former Soviet Union.
- \*cost overruns** When the money actually paid to military suppliers exceeds the estimated costs.
- \*disengagement** The belief that the United States was harmed by its war in Vietnam and so should avoid supposedly similar events.
- \*gold plating** The tendency of Pentagon officials to ask weapons contractors to meet excessively high requirements.
- \*human rights** The view that we should try to improve the lives of people in other countries.

<b>*isolationism</b>	The opinion that the United States should withdraw from world affairs.
<b>*military-industrial complex</b>	An alleged alliance between military leaders and corporate leaders.
<b>*worldview</b>	A comprehensive opinion of how the United States should respond to world problems.

## THEME A: FOREIGN POLICY AS MAJORITARIAN POLITICS

### Instructor Resources

Royce J. Ammon, *Global Television and the Shaping of World Politics: CNN, Telediplomacy, and Foreign Policy*. McFarland & Company, 2001.

Niall Ferguson, *Colossus: The Price of America's Empire*. New York: Penguin, 2004.

Richard N. Haass and Meghan L. O'Sullivan, eds., *Honey and Vinegar: Incentives, Sanctions, and Foreign Policy*. Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 2000.

Ryan C. Hendrickson, *The Clinton Wars: The Constitution, Congress, and War Powers*. Vanderbilt University Press, 2002.

Samuel P. Huntington, *Who are We: The Challenges to America's National Identity*. New York: Simon & Schuster, 2004.

Donald Kagan and Fredrick W. Kagan, *While America Sleeps*. New York: St. Martin's Press, 2000.

James M. Lindsay and Michael E. O'Hanlon, *Defending America: The Case for Limited National Missile Defense*. Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 2001.

Catherine A. Luthur, *Press Images, National Identity, and Foreign Policy: A Case Study of U.S. – Japan Relations, 1955-1995*. New York: Routledge, 2001.

Joseph S. Nye, Jr., *The Paradox of American Power: Why the World's Only Superpower Can't Go It Alone*. New York: Oxford University Press, 2002.

Michael E. O'Hanlon, *Defense Policy Choices for the Bush Administration, 2001-2005*. Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 2001.

Piers Robinson, *The Myth CNN Effect: The Myth of News Media, Foreign Policy and Intervention*. New York: Routledge, 2002.

James Shoch, *Trading Blows: Party Competition and U.S. Trade Policy in a Globalizing Era*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina, 2001.

### Summary

The relationship between democracy and foreign policy must be viewed as problematical. For de Tocqueville, democracies could not apply the firmness of purpose, efficiency of execution, secrecy, and patience that effective foreign policy requires. During the Vietnam War era, on the other hand, it was often charged that too much secrecy and firmness of purpose (without regard to popular wishes) were the problem.

This chapter is chiefly concerned with foreign policy insofar as it displays the characteristics of majoritarian politics. The “grand issues” of war, peace, and global diplomacy are the subject of these politics. Of course, interest-group politics may affect foreign policy, as in tariff battles in which the users of imports (as well as those who want to keep them out) are well organized. Client politics may

play a role, too—providing aid to corporations doing business abroad and historical American support for Israel are two examples. (More recently, Arab Americans and energy interests have mobilized on the other side of this last issue, and it more nearly resembles interest group politics.) If an issue is majoritarian in nature, the president usually dominates. If interest-group or client politics is involved, Congress plays a much larger role.

The Constitution offers the president and Congress an “invitation to struggle” in the conduct of foreign affairs. The president is commander in chief of the armed forces, appoints ambassadors, and negotiates treaties. But the Senate must approve those treaties and ambassadorial appointments. Congress must appropriate money to fund military (or other) ventures abroad, and it must declare war. This enumeration of powers suggests that the president and Congress are evenly matched; in fact, the president is far more powerful. The president often sends troops abroad without formal congressional assent (five of this nation’s eleven major wars have not been formally declared), and is much more successful in gaining congressional approval of foreign policy proposals than of domestic policy proposals. Aaron Wildavsky has concluded that there are *two presidencies*, a weak domestic one and a strong foreign one. Note, however, that even in foreign affairs the U.S. president is weaker than chief executives in other democracies.

The Supreme Court has fairly consistently held that the conduct of foreign policy is a political question to be decided between the president and Congress. It not only has held that the federal government holds powers never mentioned in the Constitution, but has also upheld extreme cases of violations of civil liberties when defended on the grounds of internal security during wartime (for example, the internment of Japanese-Americans during World War II).

Congress does have some ability to check the president, however. Its control of the purse strings is probably its most important weapon. Congress imposed three kinds of restrictions on the president after the end of the Vietnam War. First, it limited military or economic aid to other countries (Turkey and Angola are examples). Second, it enacted the War Powers Resolution, which required congressional approval of any commitment of United States troops in hostile situations abroad for over sixty days. However, in the *Chadha* case, the Supreme Court struck down a portion of the act that authorized legislative vetoes to control arms sales abroad. Even if the rest of the law is sustained by the courts in the future, its practical political significance is questionable, because Congress is not likely to challenge the president in either a brief military operation such as the one in Grenada or in a protracted conflict such as the Vietnam War. Also, President Reagan’s commitment of U.S. Marines in Lebanon revealed congressional flexibility because an eighteen-month period was authorized rather than the original sixty days. Third, it created intelligence oversight committees in both houses in order to control the CIA’s activities, including covert operations.

## Discussion Questions

1. Why did de Tocqueville believe that democracies have great trouble conducting foreign affairs effectively? What claims are made by those who believe the exact opposite—that policies are made badly when elites have too much discretion and are made better when they are aired democratically?
2. What about foreign-policy issues today? Can you think of any cases in which our policy was harmed by open debate? Can you think of any cases in which our policy was harmed by being made in secret and where open debate would have produced a better policy? What about (a) peace negotiations in the Middle East; (b) granting China Most Favored Nation Status as a trading partner; (c) the war in the Persian Gulf; (d) troop commitments to U.N. peacekeeping? (e) the invasion of Afghanistan? (*Instructor: Add more recent examples.*) How much of the policy-making in each of these circumstances was done in secret? Was there a good reason for secrecy, or was secrecy used as a means of evading the Constitution?

3. If the Constitution does not make the president clearly dominant in foreign affairs, how has the president managed to exert so much power? Could Congress be dominant if it wanted to? Does Congress fail to exercise power (a) for policy reasons (unified leadership is needed and Congress knows that it cannot provide it); (b) for institutional reasons (the president has access to better information than does Congress); or (c) for political reasons (Congressional members do not profit politically from tackling foreign policy issues)?
4. On what basis have most people judged whether the president's powers are too extensive or too limited? Does the same go for domestic affairs?
5. What role has the Supreme Court played in foreign policy? How does this compare to the role it has played in civil rights or in business regulation?
6. Does the fact that public opinion supports presidential initiatives mean that the president can act independently and then count on public support?
7. How are foreign affairs more politically profitable for the president than domestic affairs? Does this suggest that the president will allot too much attention to foreign affairs relative to domestic affairs? Does this suggest that the president is at a disadvantage in dealing with foreign leaders who need not worry about public opinion in their nations?
8. Congress enacted the War Powers Resolution to curtail presidential power in the area of war-making. Can the president still act without prior congressional approval? Doesn't the War Powers Act make legal what was once probably not so—the ability of the president to act without consulting Congress? How does the War Powers Resolution apply to nuclear war?

## Abstract for Theme A

### The War Powers Act

In war powers, as in so many other areas, the Constitution provides the executive and legislative branches with what one scholar has termed “an invitation to struggle.” In Article I, Section 8, the Congress is given the power to declare war, and to raise and support an army and navy. In Article II, Section 2, the president is given the power to serve as commander—in chief of the military services and of the state militias. Thus, the Congress declares war and the president conducts war. Since World War II, however, presidents have conducted wars that have not been declared by the Congress. The Korean War and the Vietnam War are only two of the most obvious examples of undeclared wars.

- Whenever possible, the president is to consult with the Congress in advance of commitment of troops to a hostile environment.
- Within 48 hours of a troop commitment, the president is to submit a report to the Congress.
- The troops can be committed for no longer than sixty days. After that time period, unless one of the following three options is employed, they must be returned home.
  - The Congress may explicitly authorize a thirty-day extension for the troops.
  - The Congress may declare war.
  - The Congress may issue a statutory authorization, permitting the troops to remain and to engage in the hostilities.
- Whenever there has not been a declaration of war or a statutory authorization, the Congress may issue a concurrent resolution directing the president to disengage the troops.

Nixon vetoed the War Powers Act, whose veto message described the legislation as unconstitutional and dangerous. The veto override was narrow in the House (just four votes over the requisite two-thirds majority), but more comfortable in the Senate (a thirteen-vote margin). Every president since has agreed with Nixon's assessment. Consequently, each has provided Congress with just the minimal amount of information necessary to satisfy the reporting requirements. And, of the military actions taken in the presidential administrations affected by the War Powers Act, only the Gulf War received a full congressional debate and formally voted statutory authorization.

## Discussion Questions

1. Each element of the War Powers Act has its problematic aspects. What requirements would be most likely to be set aside by a president intent on functioning as a commander in chief? What requirements would a Congress be most likely to insist be observed, in order to sustain its role in making foreign and military policy?
2. Why would members of Congress have voted against the War Powers Act and, later, in support of the presidential veto?
3. How has the War Powers Act worked? Research the early conduct and congressional response to a recent troop deployment.
4. The Supreme Court has ruled that the legislative veto is unconstitutional and presidents have consequently maintained that the core of the War Powers Act is therefore nullified. Does the War Powers Act involve a legislative veto? What alternative arrangements may be set in place, so that the Congress and the president properly balance their respective war powers?
5. Does the War Powers Act actually expand the president's power, by allowing the commander in chief to act until explicitly stopped by the Congress?
6. Did the Framers of the Constitution make a mistake, in dividing war powers between the two branches? Does the need for speedy and unilateral decision-making in foreign policy dictate that military deployments should be made by the president alone?

## THEME B: THE FOREIGN POLICY ELITE

### Instructor Resources

Colton Campbell et al., *Congress and the Politics of Foreign Policy*. New York: Prentice Hall, 2002.

Noam Chomsky, *A New Generation Draws the Line: Kosovo, East Timor, and the Standards of the West*. Verso Books, 2001.

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Henry A. Kissinger, *Years of Renewal*. Touchstone Books, 2000.

Robert S. McNamara, James G. Blight, and Robert K. Brigham, *Argument Without End: In Search of Answers to the Vietnam Tragedy*. Public Affairs, 2000.

Walter Russell Mead, *Power, Terror, Peace and War: America's Grand Strategy in a World at Risk*. New York: Knopf, 2004.

Johannes Morsink, *The Universal Declaration of Human Rights: Origins, Drafting, and Intent*. University of Pennsylvania Press, 2000.

Robert I. Rotberg and Dennis Thompson, eds., *Truth v. Justice*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2000.

## Summary

Public opinion provides support for presidential initiatives in foreign policy but no specific direction. In foreign policy, more than in other policy areas, elite *worldviews* determine policy. A worldview is a more or less comprehensive picture of the critical problems facing the United States in the world and of the appropriate ways of responding. Elite worldviews are typically the result of learning the “lessons” of some foreign policy disaster. Prevailing worldviews can change rapidly. Before World War II, the public opposed U.S. involvement in world affairs. However, from the end of World War II until the mid-1970s the dominant worldview was based on the lessons of Munich and Pearl Harbor. Munich taught a generation that it is futile to compromise with aggression and to attempt appeasement. Pearl Harbor discredited the view that America could successfully remain aloof from foreign entanglements. Thus the strategy of *containment* required that any Soviet attempt at expansion be met with counterforce. This became known as the *anti-appeasement worldview*.

Failure of America’s Vietnam policy (which was an application of the lessons of Munich and Pearl Harbor) impressed on a new generation of foreign policy experts a very different view. The *Vietnam worldview*, also known as the *disengagement* worldview, inclined toward minimizing, rather than maximizing, American interventions abroad; less military spending; more emphasis on negotiation with the Soviet Union; and a more favorable view of the Third World. The elite holding the Vietnam worldview came to power with Jimmy Carter in 1976. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan provoked Carter to take a tougher stand toward the Soviet Union, and the Iranian hostage crisis made Americans more willing to be assertive with foreign nations. When Ronald Reagan took office in 1981, he brought with him advisers and cabinet secretaries committed to a military buildup, a tougher line toward Russia, and the restoration of the Munich-Pearl Harbor worldview. In the 1984 election, the Democratic party (particularly Gary Hart) attacked Reagan’s policy for neglecting the social factors (in Central America) that encourage communism and also for relying excessively on force. President Bush continued, in many respects, the Reagan foreign policy agenda. During President Clinton’s first term, however, the disengagement worldview came to the fore.

At times, however, the Clinton administration abandoned the disengagement worldview for the human instances, troops have been committed to stop genocidal policies. Observers note, however, that the human rights argument seems to surface almost exclusively in European policy decisions. Similar violations in the “third world” have resulted in verbal criticisms but not in military troop commitments. As the George W. Bush administration weighed the need to expand the parameters of the war on terrorism and invade Iraq, it rights worldview. In these is members began to articulate a doctrine of preemption. This doctrine stated that there was sometimes a need for the United States to take preemptive action against “rogue states” on behalf of its citizens. In discussing this doctrine, with specific reference to Iraq, many analysts once again made reference to the lessons of Munich. The anti-appeasement worldview, therefore, seemed to be resurfacing among some foreign policy elites.

## Discussion Questions

1. What principles should consistently guide the foreign policy of the United States? Do these fundamental principles represent commonalities among the different worldviews?

2. Which worldview would you endorse for the foreign policy of the United States? Why advocate on behalf of this worldview? Would your perspective change if you were president or a member of Congress? If your status as a civilian or member of the military services changed?
3. Do shifts in the worldviews guiding United States foreign policy endanger the nation's security? Why or why not? Do these changes endanger our allies?
4. Given the constant focus on rights in the Constitution, why has the human-rights worldview only recently gained influence among our foreign policy elite?

## THEME C: HOW ARE MILITARY SPENDING DECISIONS MADE?

### Instructor Resources

Edward R. Drachman and Alan Shank, *Presidents and Foreign Policy: Countdown to Ten Controversial Decisions*. Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1997.

Michael J. Hogan, *America in the World: The Historiography of American Foreign Relations Since 1941*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996.

Michael Krepon, *Cooperative Threat Reduction, Missile Defense, and the Nuclear Future*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002.

Lisa L. Martin, *Democratic Commitments*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2000.

Barry S. Rundquist and Thomas M. Carsey, *Congress and Defense Spending: The Distributive Politics of Military Procurement*. Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press, 2002.

Richard Sobel, *Public Opinion in American Foreign Policy: From Vietnam to the Nineties*. New York: Oxford University Press, 2001.

Rachel Weber, *Swords into Dow Shares: Governing the Decline of the Military-Industrial Complex*. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2000.

George C. Wilson, *This War Really Matters, Inside the Fight for Defense Dollars*. Washington, D.C.: CQ Press, 1999.

### Summary

The conventional view of national defense policy-making is that it is an example of majoritarian politics, with benefits and costs widely distributed. The rival theory of the *military-industrial complex* holds that spending for national defense is the result of client politics. Money is spent to benefit military officers and/or corporations and/or members of Congress with concentrations of military spending in their districts.

In evaluating these theories, it is important to remember that the *National Security Act of 1947* set up a structure to ensure civilian control of the military. The three armed forces are separate entities, each with the right to communicate directly with Congress. The total level of military spending is heavily determined by the president. Defense spending had not increased, but rather dropped, for several years. In 1992 chain-weighted dollars, defense spending amounted to \$266.4 billion in 1977, \$409.2 billion in 1987, \$314.9 billion in 1996, and \$265.4 billion in FY 2002. From 1977 to 1987, there was an increase of just 1 percent in the percentage of GDP-devoted defense spending (from 6.2 % to 7.2%). From 1987 to 1996, that percentage dropped by 2.7 percent, as spending fell to 4.6 percent of GDP. In 2001, however, the terrorist attacks led to an increase in military spending: The Department of Defense's current budget plan (through 2009) requires higher levels of spending than there have been in any year since 1980.

Changing the allocation of defense spending among the military services is more difficult than changing the total level of spending. Each service fights to prevent its share of the pie from being cut, and each has important political allies among interest groups and in Congress. Thus each major service receives roughly a third of the defense budget, and any changes are incremental. The key decisions surround the purchase of major new weapons systems, and these decisions produce an intense political debate involving the Pentagon, the White House, Congress, and various interest groups.

Congress is an important part of that debate, but its role has changed over the years. Before World War II, Congress made exceedingly detailed decisions about military matters. During the war, it retreated somewhat. After the war, until the late 1960s, Congress pushed for larger military programs than the president favored. In the late 1960s, as a result of Vietnam, Congress took a more critical stance toward the military. After 1977, Congress again seemed more receptive to defense spending. Congress was now in step with public opinion, which also desired higher levels of defense spending. Both President Carter and President Reagan contributed to the defense buildup. However, the increases in military spending raised the traditional issue of guns versus butter, the argument being that money spent on defense sacrifices social welfare programs. Still, there is no firm evidence that this tradeoff actually operates.

Congressional decisions about military procurement proceed in two stages. In the first, there is intense ideological debate about the merits of the proposed expenditure. Once the expenditure is voted, the second stage begins. Members then compete to maximize their constituents' benefits.

*Cost overruns* are common in military procurement. The reason is not particularly sinister: most weapons must be invented before they can be built, and it is difficult to predict what the weapon will cost because it does not yet exist. The problem is exacerbated by the insistence of military officers on the best technology possible and by the tendency of defense contractors to submit unrealistically low bids on the assumption that they will afterward be reimbursed for cost overruns. One partial solution, adopted in the 1970s, is the fly-before-you-buy procedure by which the government commissions the production of prototypes of competing models (for example, airplanes) and buys in quantity only after seeing their actual performance.

## Discussion Questions

1. Should the United States purchase weapons manufactured by other countries if these weapons prove superior and cheaper?
2. Each branch of the military purchases its own weapons systems, which sometimes leads to problems. For example, because the army and navy had incompatible communications systems, during the Grenada invasion a soldier was forced to use his AT&T calling card to call the Navy Department to direct off-shore naval fire. Should the services be required to purchase the same merchandise when feasible? What reasons exist for not doing so?
3. What does it mean to say that decisions about the allocation of the military budget are incremental? Why have efforts to engage in rational planning and substantial reallocations of resources often failed? Hasn't this succeeded in addressing the base closures issue?
4. How does Congress differ from the president as a maker of defense policy? To which branch would we look for rational planning? For representation of various and diverse interests? For representation of public opinion? For technical expertise in evaluating weapons systems?
5. The text says that military officers "naturally" want the best new weapons that modern technology can devise. What constraints need to be imposed on these desires, given other governmental priorities and budgetary constraints?